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I 
THE PROBLEM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
N all the dominions of science, and especially in those re- I lating to  the human subject and dealing with first prin- 
ciples, there are questions-I will not say of eternal standing 
and controversy (because to  say “eternal” is to  anticipate an 
issue of which, in view of the future’s uncertainty, we are not 
authorized to speak), but indeterminate questions which 
from the beginning of the known history of scientific thought 
down to  the present have been treated by the different 
schools of thinkers very differently. Seen thus through the 
medley of systems and opinions, these questions give the im- 
pression of something which is insoluble and by all our pro- 
cesses of knowledge unattainable, something in regard to  
which it is useless to devote time and energy, since the solu- 
tion arrived a t  will not give universal satisfaction, a sign 
that it is not truly scientific,-and in this, indeed, is explained 
the position of those individuals (by no means few in num- 
ber) who, intent on the scientjfic requirements of precision 
1 Three  lectures presented at  the inauguration of the Rice Institute, by 
Professor Rafael Altarnira, late Professor of the History of Spanish Law in 
the University of Oviedo, Director of Elementary Education in the Spanish 
Ministry of Public Instruction. 
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and exactitude, exclude such problems from the sphere of 
science and disdain and abandon their investigation. 
In  spite of such exclusion, the thinking classes of humanity 
(which are not limited to  the professional scientists) persist 
in stating these problems and in asking questions relating to  
them o r  derived from them. These inquiries demonstrate 
that the problems themselves are a part  of an inherent and 
natural curiosity within us, and are  a necessity inseparable 
from the human spirit-at least as it has been constituted up 
to  the present. W e  can say no more than this, for  it should 
not be forgotten that all our observations regarding our own 
nature are based on what has emanated from a period of 
human life which may seem long, but which is short when 
considered in comparison with what that life may be pro- 
longed to  in the future. Our hypothesis, given the present 
nature of our intelligence, can never, however fecund the 
imagination, exceed the finite number of occurrences which 
embraces the known reality. As this limitation to  actual ex- 
perience is common to all the orders of our reason, it is clear 
that we are obliged always to  work upon the basis of our 
mind as it now is and has fo r  some time presumably to  con- 
tinue. 
T h e  curiosity which belongs to  our minds as to-day consti- 
tuted, then, inevitably causes at one time or  another the same 
questions to  be raised, and impels even the professional 
scientists to  formulate them, notwithstanding the futility of 
previous efforts. But i f  all this is certain, it is not less so 
that some of them, although lacking solutions unanimously 
accepted, begin to  show, amid the medley of opinions in 
regard to them, a certain general orientation or  certain 
points of common acquiescence which signify their advance 
toward a more scientific basis, a surer and more satisfactory 
ground than that hitherto occupied. I t  is this which is occur- 
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ring with the question of the Philosophy of History, and to 
signalize and determine in regard to this question that gen- 
eral orientation and those points of acquiescence seems to 
me a service that would be of indisputable utility. 
I t  will be useful, in the first place, as a basis of future in- 
vestigation, as a basis of real progress on the road to  a s o h -  
tion,-on a road which is, properly speaking, scientific,- 
since progress in the knowledge of things depends on the 
clarity and security of what has already been established. 
But it will also be useful for another reason, a consideration 
of a social character which professionals are in the habit of 
overlooking. I refer to  the influence exerted by their doc- 
trines on the masses among whom these doctrines become 
translated into lines of opinion and of conduct. Fo r  a scien- 
tist that which alone is of importance and alone is worthy of 
attention is the truth o r  the error of a theory, and from 
this standpoint he may, and does, neglect all theories which 
appear to him untrue, discarding them from that which 
merits his attention. Thus, in the Philosophy of His- 
tory a providentialist will reject and disqualify the doctrines 
of a rationalist or  those of a positivist, and vice versa,  but 
neither one nor the other will be able to  prevent these con- 
flicting doctrines from influencing large numbers of people 
and guiding them in not a few questions of their lives. With 
equal reason the contrary positions of those who admit a 
Philosophy of History and those who deny such a thing 
collide with and annul one another, but both are powerless 
before the fact that many people will accept one position or 
the other;  and as, in the long run, that which matters is that 
which influences the masses, the conflicting theories which 
claim the solution of these indecisive questions come to pos- 
sess for the sociologist, for the practical man, and for the 
historian himself a value which is at best only equally pro- 
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portioned to the scope of their diffusion and to the force of 
the conviction they produce. All, then, which may tend to 
eliminate divergences, discover points of contact, or, better 
expressing it, to intensify in the public mind the consciousness 
of common affirmations in what has arisen from distinct 
startingpoints and systems,-affirmations which have not, 
perhaps, been realized by the majority,-is preparing the 
way for an ever greater homogeneity in thought and action. 
Now, of late years, in the sphere of the Philosophy of 
History, owing to the discussions which the actual statement 
and formulation of the question has produced, there has 
been a fairly concrete determination of factors and a clarifi- 
cation of ideas relating to the subject. Neither movement 
has descended to the great sphere of those who are non- 
specialist but cultured sufficiently to produce in it a favorable 
change of the same character; but this same lack of corre- 
spondence between the scientific position up to date and the 
sediment of antiquated and already scientifically rectified 
ideas which have passed down into the masses as accepted 
knowledge renders all the more necessary that labor of diffu- 
sion whose first effect has to be the clear determining and 
sizing up of fundamental opinions and authorities. T h e  ne- 
cessity is all the greater in so f a r  as one may consider in- 
cluded in the masses the large number of persons whom, at  
first sight, we should qualify as cultured, persons who have 
obtained university degrees and who undoubtedly possess 
wide information and clear intelligence. Thus, I have heard 
my book “The  History of Spain and the Spanish Civiliza- 
tion” described as a work of historical philosophy, although 
it is simple and unmistakable narrative, simply because it 
contains, with the usual chapters on political history, others 
on what has been called Kulturgeschichte, or  internal his- 
tory. 
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This very common error signifies not just a vagueness in 
the conception of the Philosophy of History (vagueness 
there is as well, and in due course we shall examine i t ) ,  but 
an absolute disorientation in which it is impossible to form 
any argument whatever or  even make one’s self intelligible 
to those laboring in the fallacy, for  the simple reason that 
while employing the same name, they imply something 
wholly different. Let us begin, then, by rectifying this error, 
that it may once and for  all be deleted from the public mind. 
Every history-book is pure narrative if it limits itself to re- 
lating facts. Although it may embrace in entirety every 
sphere in the whole life of a state, including the history of 
its thought in the various orders of the sciences and in those 
treating of human questions, it is not a book of Philosophy 
of History. It may be the work of an historian who does 
not believe that science possible o r  regards it as dissevered 
from his professional mission: his ideas in this respect will 
not in the least have been invalidated. 
Equally common with this error, and perhaps more so, 
there is another one more difficult of eradication and of 
graver consequences for the reason that it comes near, ap- 
parently, to the actual field of philosophy itself instead of 
being plainly and at  a glance outside of it. This is the error 
in which, in the name of philosophy, is inferred every 
generalization regarding historical facts. T o  those laboring 
in this error everything of a general character that may be 
gleaned from an individual history of concrete facts-the 
character of an institution in a given epoch, the dominant 
and central current in a series of events, the distinctive feat- 
ure of the history of a state, the trajectory and orientation of 
an order of ideas-is Philosophy of History. But as, apart  
from such works of erudition as are purely concrete and 
monographic, every historian must generalize without de- 
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parting from his own material of facts, it may be deduced, 
according to this criterion, that there will scarcely be a his- 
tory-book which is not philosophical. A book which sum- 
marizes in a great compendium, a great “synthesis,” as it is 
commonly but erroneously expressed, the facts of a period, 
of an age, o r  of a state, and popular lectures which epitomize 
the great results of detailed investigation, would be Philos- 
ophy of History when, in general, they are rigorously limited 
to the field of what is narrative-that is to say, purely his- 
torical. T h e  celebrated lectures, for  example, on the “His- 
tory of Civilization in Europe,” by Guizot, do not in any 
way possess the philosophical character, although their 
eloquent expression and the reflections and opinions often 
to be found in them which do not cover a ground that 
is, properly speaking, historical, added, moreover, to the lax 
and careless criticism of contemporaries to  whom all this 
justly came as something new, led to the lectures being desig- 
nated by many as philosophical. Generally speaking, one 
may a 5 r m ,  on the contrary, that every generalization about 
facts, while it remains a generalization, and however ab- 
stract be its character, is not philosophical. W h a t  always 
result from it are facts, very general, very comprehensive, 
but, in the end and in the long run, facts. Laws themselves, 
o r  the course they follow in a more or less extended period, 
are likewise facts, although of an abstract character. They 
express what is the line and orientation of individual hap- 
penings; they do  not explain them philosophically or, to be 
more precise, metaphysically. 
I have now just enunciated what, in my opinion, is a basal 
quality in the Philosophy of History; but, to avoid confu- 
sion, it will be necessary to define it. Every explanation of 
facts is not a philosophic explanation. Naturally it is not so 
when it treats of causes which are directly o r  indirectly his- 
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torical-that is to  say, determines temporal origins and 
precedents, the factors behind an appearance and effect, the 
necessity of a phenomenon in a given moment. No one will 
describe as philosophical the explanation of the collapse of 
the Invincible Armada, an explanation which is entirely con- 
fined to the most concrete facts and as historical as any in the 
world ; nevertheless many other analogous explanations of 
greater o r  less significance than the above are still described 
with manifest equivocation as philosophical. The  explana- 
tion of the Hellenic genius and culture as a consequence of 
oriental origins, of such and such influences derived from the 
geographical situation of that people, is equally not of a 
philosophic character. All such explanation moves entirely 
amid temporal causes and on a ground which is purely his- 
torical, however vast and general its embrace of the concrete 
facts and data. Fo r  the explanation to  assume a philosophic 
character it must treat not of temporal but of permanent 
causes and must inclose facts in a metaphysical impulsion and 
causality outside of the field of history. I t  is not without 
purpose that the science under consideration is called Phi- 
losophy of History (of human history, it is clear),  which 
means that it is a philosophic science and ought t o  be treated 
according to its nature and not on historical lines. T h e  
antagonism between the Philosophy of History and the His- 
tory of Philosophy, which has been shown and explained by 
certain schools of thinkers, defines thoroughly the distinctive 
character of each of these sciences, notwithstanding that the 
terms employed in them are identical : the different relative 
position of both terms in each of the two cases signalizes 
plainly the opposition in question. 
I t  is necessary, then, to  abandon all false conceptions of 
the science concerned with these reflections in order to place 
ourselves in the actual field with which it corresponds. Once 
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settled there, the discussion of the problems belonging to  this 
science becomes disentangled because we know now the value 
of the words employed and are no longer in the plight of 
discussing indefinitely and without understanding one an- 
other two things which have nothing else in common but the 
name we give them, a name which is applicable only to one. 
Wi th  this point settled, it is now possible to propound the 
first question of the Philosophy of History, which is precisely 
that now most under discussion in our times-to wit, the pos- 
sibility of the science in question. In any case this would 
have to be the first question to be discussed and to be solved; 
for, what would be the use of fantastically pursuing the prin- 
ciples of a science devoid of all reality-that is to say, impos- 
sible? W e  should be involved in a labor that is not only 
useless but pernicious, through the false ideas that would be 
disseminated. 
Before examining this question and expressing in regard 
to  it, if necessary, a personal opinion, it is important to sepa- 
rate it from another which is often confounded with it, the 
one prejudging the other with its own solution. I t  is one 
thing to question the possibility of a Philosophy of History, 
be what it may the field of science in which it is established, 
and it is another thing to inquire if historians as such are 
capable of creating it, o r  even merely if its existence concerns 
or  ought to concern them. T h e  distinction between these 
two questions is all the more necessary in so f a r  as many 
treatises have dealt only with the second of the two, and 
presumed, in the solution of it, to have solved the first and 
fundamental question. In  reality, the second question, as 
it is commonly propounded, is beside the point. If the 
Philosophy of History, given that it is possible, is a philo- 
sophic and not an historical science, it clearly follows that it 
devolves not on the historian but on the philosopher to for- 
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mulate and clarify it. I t  is legitimate and comprehensible on 
the part  of the historian to declare himself as such incompe- 
tent; to refuse to employ his energies in the investigation 
of an aspect of human history which does not concern him; 
and to demand the requisite time and energy for what does. 
F o r  this reason it is a strong position which has been adopted 
by those who, under the title of historians, refuse to busy 
themselves with that problem, and even regard it as per 
nicious that it should be mixed with those peculiar to history; 
basing their opinion either on the supposition that the char- 
acter of historical knowledge fundamentally prohibits a 
philosophical explanation, o r  on the supposition that the 
actual position of historical science does not as yet authorize 
it.’ Observe, however, that the majority of those of this 
opinion admit that outside the sphere of history, in the field 
of other science, the problem is legitimate and is one that 
may be formulated and considered. If he wishes to  abide in 
his own sphere, it is not the professional historian who will 
study it, but of the results of the investigations which others 
have accomplished he will be able to take advantage. 
It is clear of course that this does not exclude a historian 
from studying the Philosophy of History, just as he may be 
interested in astronomy o r  any other science, nor can it be 
denied that in the fact of his being a historian his prepara- 
tion in the study of the problem is the more adequate for  a 
deep penetration into a given one of its aspects.2 T h e  natu- 
1An exposition of the situation of that question to date is to be found in 
my book “Questions of Modern History” (Madrid, I ~ w ) ,  Introduction and 
Chapter 111. 
a One of the scientific weaknesses in many authorities on the Philosophy of 
History who would be styled classical-and even of not a few modern phi- 
losophers-consists in their not being or not having been sufficiently hi$- 
iosians; that they do not see the problem in its essential historical perspec- 
tive; and that they have failed to fulfil that exigency which Dilthey (“Em- 
lestung ni de Gentenvissenschaften”) formulated, saying: “The thinker who 
takes as his object the historical world, ought to be intimately acquainted with 
the immediate material of history and should be entirely the master of his 
medium.” 
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ral supposition, in fact, is that it will be the historian who 
will be interested in that problem because the constant vision 
of the historical material will continually produce in him a 
desire for  an explanation transcending the mere facts them- 
selves; and, in any case, as a man of intelligence he will be 
brought up against the problem, though he may not embark 
on the solution of it. Nor ,  moreover, in the preceding affir- 
mations relative to the independence of position between 
the scientific sphere and the philosophical is there any denial 
of the intimate bond which unites them, and in virtue 
of which not only does the philosopher require, as was said, 
to be master of historical matter, but the historian will find 
in philosophy a force which, although it is not his business to 
create it, will help him in the handling of his data. 
Now, it is quite another thing to  state the objection in 
regard to a Philosophy of History to the philosophers them- 
selves, basing one’s position on the present status of our 
knowledge of the history of mankind. Such an objection- 
distinct from that embodied in this argument against the pos- 
sibility merely of the “historians” creating a Philosophy of 
History-may be based on an affirmation of that strict inter- 
dependence in which, we affirm, both terms are to be found. 
Kohlen has expressed it in a decisive manner with reference 
to the Philosophy of Law:  “Without a universal history of 
law a true juridic philosophy is as impossible as is a philos- 
ophy of humanity without a similar history of mankind and 
a philosophy of language without linguistics.” This, then, 
denies for all men the possibility of a Philosophy of History, 
although only so long as it fails to fulfil that fundamental 
requisite of previous acquaintance with the facts in all the 
amplitude necessary that it may be possible to philosophize 
about them; and, to my mind, this is the strongest objection 
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that can be opposed to the present possibility of a Philosophy 
of History. 
As a matter of fact, it is only by the force of habit and the 
suggestion exerted by those books (that is to  say, the doc- 
trines elaborated in them and the systems formulated, which 
give the false appearance of something perfect and conclu- 
sive) that we say and even believe that we are acquainted 
with the History of Humanity. Certain it is that consider- 
able in range as is our historical information, and although 
that information has augmented so vastly in one century in 
regard to  the above branch of history in particular, and 
become perfected in certitude and thoroughness, there still 
remains much for  us to  learn, still many points of obscurity 
and vagueness, many facts and theories in suspense; and that 
on a basis so imperfect any philosophic structure will be 
flimsy, collapsing a t  the least pressure. For,  i f  we do  not 
possess our facts securely and in entirety, how can we build 
upon them anything stable o r  secure? T o  the immense force 
embodied in this argument is due the most useful and fruitful 
of the results which modern criticism has produced in the 
discussion of the problem now before us. By dint of this 
argument has been demonstrated the inconsistency between 
systems relating to  the Philosophy of History constructed a 
priori by writers who, in not a few cases, are ranked among 
the great. This  failure was merited, as merited is the smile 
with which, to-day, we regard, for example, that infantile 
endeavor to  inwrap the history of mankind in periods or 
ages of development which limited the future and closed up 
the eternity of life. In  drawing up a clear table of all in 
these systems which was warrantable and final, the criticism 
of the professional historians has constituted a service to  
science of immense value, clearing the road so that it should 
be unobstructed by pseudo-scientific-though some of them 
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colossal- structures which would render it difficult to  make 
the labor of the future step by step and in certainty. It is 
true, however, that it has produced also a pernicious skep- 
ticism in many people who, with the precipitancy so natural 
and difficult to  check in human nature when a definite conclu- 
sion is arrived at and a judgment passed, have confused the 
breakdown of the Philosophy of History as interpreted by 
certain authors with the total collapse of the whole science. 
To convince the public of the error of assuming the second 
issue as a consequence of the first is in fact one of the duties 
of men of science in the social aspect of their labor. 
Let us return now to the starting-point of these considei-a- 
tions. T o  deny the present possibility of a Philosophy of 
History because we do not as yet know enough of the history 
of mankind is not to  deny its possibility absolutely and for- 
ever ; agreed, however, on this point, the affirmation which 
has led us to  it reappears and confronts us. W e  are still a t  
grips with the fundamental problem. In  short, if it is proved 
that it is definitely impossible for us to  arrive at that initial 
historical knowledge which has to be the basis of a scientific 
philosophy regarding it, o r  if it is true, as many believe, that 
historical knowledge is incapable of scientific qualities and 
even of precision and of certitude, then to philosophize about 
it will be eternally impossible. T h e  problem, therefore, is 
transferred to another ground and obliges us to  discuss pre- 
viously all those questions alluded to, and which in our days 
cover, as is known, an extensive literature. From the dis- 
cussion as to the degree of generalization which is possible 
in regard to facts about humanity ( a  discussion maintained 
on the extreme wing by Xenopol, who denied that there 
could be any generalization), to  the transference of history 
wholly and solely into the field of science, the series of minor 
problems presented in the different opinions upheld by the 
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specialists to-day require to  be tackled and cleared up in 
order that we may either be free of all incubus in the affirma- 
tion of a Philosophy of History or else abandon the dream 
of its possibility. I t  would be long and wearisome here and 
now to enter on this task which I have already elsewhere 
accomp1ished.l I will refer only to  the conclusion I there 
arrived at, and take my stand upon it under the plea of a 
personal opinion. T h e  doctrine may be thus epitomized: 
In  the present situation of our knowledge relating to  these 
questions, and of the opinion of men of science respecting 
them, there is a decided weakness to  be observed in the ar- 
guments employed to deny the scientific character (the 
possibility of such) in history, either because the general con- 
ception of science renders it possible to-day to state the prob- 
lem with a different meaning to  that of Aristotle, o r  because 
it is not so certain as is commonly believed that history is 
confined purely to  the observation of individual facts, form- 
ing itself into a narrative without any generalization (of a 
more o r  less abstract character, that is, as all generalizations 
a re ) ,  in which each fact conserves its unique and differential 
characteristic and only on the strength of it is mentioned. 
Fo r  myself, personally, however, the crux of the problem is 
not in whether historical knowledge conforms or not to  the 
Aristotelian definition of science, and whether it is suscep- 
tible to  abstractions of greater o r  less amplitude, but in 
whether it can attain those qualities of truth, clearness and 
certainty which distinguish scientific from vulgar knowledge. 
If  to the scheme and elaboration of true, evident and certain 
knowledge which has as its objective the facts about human- 
ity in time and space (and derives from that objective its 
own internal coherence) is begrudged the denomination 
1 In the book mentioned previously, “Questions of Modern History,” Chap- 
ter 111, No. 3. 
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“scientific,” the question a t  issue is solely the question of a 
name. W h a t  matters is that our knowledge of man and of 
the manifestations of society in past ages shall arrive, by 
means of a rigorous employment of the critical methods of 
investigation, at being as certain as our knowledge about 
Nature and the facts concerning her, though neither one nor 
the other, either to the observer o r  to  the experimentalist, 
delivers the totality of its abundant and ( f rom day to day at 
least) mysterious contents. 
T h e  objection, then, which, if valid, would make it impos- 
sible forever, through lack of a foundation, to philosophize 
about the history of mankind, possesses no scientific author- 
ity for  opposing an insuperable barrier to  this philosophic 
aspiration; but it does serve most effectively to moderate 
impatience and to  check precipitancy in the task of solving 
the main problem, showing the connection between this 
problem and many questions of importance still under dis- 
cussion, revealing also its complexity and suggesting that 
even on the strong basis of a personal conviction rooted in 
the feeling that a right solution is arrived at, we are to  pre- 
serve the judicious cautiousness which is characteristic of the 
truly scientific mind, and which safeguards against the pos- 
sibility of error and makes us respectful toward contrary 
opinions. All that may avoid that suspicious simplification 
of a problem in easy terms-only subjectively arrived at 
while the problem itself is divested of many elements in- 
herent in its complexity and which we fancifully qualify as 
incidental-and that provides us with the maximum quantity 
of proofs in support of our opinions by probing them and 
developing them with every kind of verification and analy- 
sis, will become a guarantee in support of our conclusion 
and of the doctrinal fabric we erect on it. I t  is for this rea- 
son that I have been explaining and examining the principal 
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objections to a Philosophy of History and the errors and 
confusions of thought in regard to  it which draw into a dis- 
tinct field-and one conducive to confusions-the interpreta- 
tion of the name. 
Over and above all this cautiousness and reservation, how- 
ever, stands out one fact which even the most decided an- 
tagonist of a Philosophy of History has to recognize, not 
only as a reality but as a thing of importance and significance. 
This fact is the persistence in the human mind-in every man 
who thinks a t  all about the world and about life-of those 
fundamental interrogatories in regard to  the actual problem 
of the philosophy in question. 
I t  is true that, in view of the potential immensity of future 
history and the paucity of that a t  our disposal ( a s  was 
observed not many months ago by your compatriot Profes- 
sor Sloanel), the persistence in humanity o r  in great masses 
of it, of a given idea o r  preoccupation does not in itself al- 
ways signify that the notion o r  ideal in question is consub- 
stantial with our nature, since it may well be a survival, a 
vibration from primitive stages of thought not yet modified, 
and to which, in fact (in that relative value of time), we are 
chronologically very near. For  this reason it is not a plau- 
sible argument in support of the necessity of an idea o r  a 
belief that for many centuries down to  the present a more o r  
less considerable number of people have supported it and 
held it to be something fundamental. T h e  future may 
wholly disillusion us. But if we ascertain that a definite idea 
o r  an ideal exists throughout mankind and is the stronger in 
a man according to  his degree of culture-in an inverse rela- 
tion to  other spiritual phenomena, which exist principally on 
a sentimental basis and are rooted above all in the uncul- 
1 “The Vision and Substance of History,” address delivered at Buffalo, New 
Published in “The American Historical Review,” York, December 27, 191 I .  
January, 1912. 
Problem of Philosophy of History 271 
tured masses o r  where culture is incipient-we have a very 
powerful argument in favor of its essential necessity for  us. 
I t  is this which occurs with the problem of the Philosophy of 
History. Be it with a clear understanding of their meaning, 
their classification in the Encyclopedia of the Sciences, o r  be 
it without ever suspecting the relationship they bear to that, 
great masses of people are to-day, as in the first stages of 
civilization, formulating questions which correspond to  the 
fundamental problems of our science ; and each individual 
unit in those masses answers these questions from the point 
of view of a religion, a system of philosophy, or  simply that 
of a common sphere of culture which finds reflection in him- 
self o r  in which he has been educated. 
I t  is true that many people pass through life without ex- 
periencing a moment in which those questions flash before 
their consciousness, because the material occupations of the 
daily struggle for  existence leave no room for  attention to  
other questions. I t  is equally true that among those who 
have broken free from this material incarceration, and even 
among those who move by custom in an intellectual circle, 
these questions pass often enough like swiftly flying sparks 
rapidly extinguished, o r  do not acquire that standard of im- 
portance which is given to  a question as the result of deep 
preoccupation. F o r  a long time, owing to  doctrinal consid- 
erations arising from the predominance of certain philo- 
sophic systems (philosophic although some of them dis- 
countenance philosophy), there has existed an indifference 
and an apathy on the part  of many people in regard to  those 
questions. Although there has been a reaction in this re- 
spect, it is a fact that the number is still large of those who 
fail to  appreciate their urgency-a fact, however, which 
depends on general causes traceable to  the conditions of our 
modern life. T h e  feverish activity, the superficiality and 
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show in which the majority exist, cause our moments of pri- 
vacy and meditation, of communion of the spirit with itself 
and of self-examination in regard to life, to become more 
difficult and rare. Distracted by the outside spectacle, we 
lose the habit of self-examination and become deaf to the 
promptings of the soul, and often enough we pass through 
life in ignorance of the exalted curiosity within us. At times, 
in moments of brief solitude and thought, these questions 
suddenly appear to us, but the intellectual effort required in 
pursuing them, and the time they would demand, make us 
shy and half afraid of them, with the result that we suppress 
them and continue as though in ignorance of their presence, 
until, in another moment of doubt, anguish, discouragement 
o r  pessimism in which the mind has nothing to  fall back upon 
o r  other resources but its own, they reappear before us, 
without, however, our ever possessing the hope of finding 
time or  opportunity for  their consideration and their answer. 
Such a state of inattention to the problem is not enough, 
then, to deny that it exists; this state of mind, on the con- 
trary, continually affirms the problem as a presence. When- 
ever we wish to hear its voice, it is with the utmost clearness 
that the voice echoes, and this in itself will be enough to 
guide us in the circumstances. 
T h e  historian derives a knowledge, o r  what he believes to 
be a knowledge, of the principal facts concerning the history 
of mankind; he traces the rise and fall of the great empires; 
he describes in its separate stages the process of civilization, 
its oscillating and, at  times, contradictory movement, the 
advantage to one state of the labor of another which it re- 
sumes and carries on, the things which have been accom- 
plished in modern times, and the trajectory and law of 
development of institutions and aspirations regarded as 
fundamental in importance; and then, over and above all 
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this remain those same great, disquieting questions which 
embody the whole program of the Philosophy of History: 
Where and toward what is mankind traveling? Is there a 
goal of which, a t  present, it is ignorant, but toward which is 
moving the central current of its history? Is it being im- 
pelled toward that end by something beyond and transcen- 
dental to  i t?  Wha t  is its significance and value in the whole, 
in the general process of the universe? Is it the creature of 
chance, o r  has it an orientation and direction? And if it has, 
can we deduce that movement through such of the facts 
about humanity as we have knowledge o f ?  Does there exist 
in the actual conditions of its life some other foundation 
than the corner-stone of history? And, following from all 
this, what state is it which marks o r  is to  mark the triumph 
of that history, the culminating situation most nearly ap- 
proaching and conforming to  the purpose of the universe? 
Is it possible to define and predict for  the future some main 
path for  man, or  is the Philosophy of History ever restricted 
to  the limits of the present? Of the utmost clarity for  every 
one engaged in the investigation of those questions which 
history, deeply contemplated, raises, must be the real and 
logical hierarchy which exists between them. No t  all are  on 
the same level, not all are equally far-reaching, and if I may 
use a phrase which is unscientific and inexact but which well 
reflects what would be thought by an uneducated person 
(that is to  say, by the majority of people) , they are not all 
equally philosophical, but some more so and others less. 
This  question of a hierarchy and of a relative importance 
possesses a greater significance than would at  first sight be 
imagined, because if we regard it as a proper and well- 
founded one, it a t  once brings us to  the point as to  whether 
o r  not the professionals, the writers who have propounded 
scientifically the problem of the Philosophy of History, have 
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grasped in fact the whole and entire problem, o r  whether 
they have limited themselves merely to  the study of some one 
o r  several of the questions it embodies, and perhaps to some 
of them which, compared with those embracing the main 
object of the science, would be called secondary; and more 
than this, we are even led to the question whether it may 
not be the case that, while preoccupied with what they re- 
garded as the real problem, they were not confining them- 
selves, through an error of perspective, to aspects of history 
quite general and comprehensive in themselves, but above 
which they have never risen, never attaining a transcen- 
dental vision in the true philosophic field to  which they 
were aspiring. I am not f a r  from thinking that it has been 
thus in the majority of cases, at least with those great 
systems which have attempted a fundamental revolution in 
the Philosophy of History. I do not allude by this to  the 
observation, continually reiterated by the critics and some of 
the most recent exponents in the matter, that the majority of 
these systems, if not all of them, losing sight of the complex 
nature of the problem, have given an ingenuous explanation 
of the History of Mankind to which is owing their failure o r  
insufficiency. I refer to  that which, apart from the degree of 
comprehensiveness in the problem they embrace, it is impos- 
sible to ask in regard to  whether those systems embark on 
the true problem of the Philosophy of History, on which 
problem depends a series of others to  be called consequences, 
o r  whether, on the contrary, it is not from one of these self- 
same “consequences” o r  minor problems that they have 
arisen, the minor being mistaken for the greater problem in 
whose solution rests that of all the others. T h a t  this equivo- 
cation is clear in Montesquieu, in Rousseau, in Voltaire ever 
so much more so, and in other authors of an analogous sci- 
entific standing in relation to the Philosophy of History,- 
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that they failed to  get abreast of the question and seriously 
tackle its solution,-no one will deny. But even with the 
great masters of the school, the same doubt is legitimate, 
and the decision may be actually against them. Will it be 
said that Herder,  notwithstanding the discrimination with 
which he subordinated to the more general standpoint those 
secondary questions which were almost the only preoccupa- 
tion of his predecessors in the century, actually raises in his 
problem of the factors and issues of the History of Mankind 
the real and basic question of the Philosophy of History? 
W a s  it approached by Kant in his own explanation of human 
progress-that is, the solution which is offered to the conflict 
between individual liberty and the general welfare-in the 
State? After this is there no room, even when the Kantian 
solution is accepted, for questions regarding the metaphys- 
ical problem of the plan of history, questions above and 
beyond the antagonism of individual liberties among them- 
selves-that is to say, questions of a more general and 
comprehensive character, by the side of which the above is 
subordinate and over concrete? And in spite of the incon- 
testable grandeur of the conception of Hegel, are we not 
left, perhaps, with the impression that in reality it lowers 
and depreciates the problem and denies it what should be a 
higher point of view, in which the development of the moral 
conscience, of freedom, and of the functions of the State be- 
comes subordinated? T h e  observation of history and its 
mode of development, and the interpretation of it exclusively 
from the viewpoint of a standard of ethics, notwithstanding 
a metaphysical quality, is yet something which too nearly ap- 
proaches a broad but, in certain respects, very concrete vision 
of historical development which allows a vaster and remoter 
problem to  float above it. Yet clearer is this in Comte and 
his disciples, and in Marx  and his, the character of whose 
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philosophies is purely an analysis of the factors behind the 
phenomena of human history, factors which only explain 
these phenomena in a secondary manner. Even in the acutest 
and most comprehensive of these systems the mind is not left 
satisfied as when one has set hands on the real solution to  a 
problem; it feels (and I say it without wishing to  depreciate 
the value of those investigations and the clear light they have 
thrown on the movements of mankind) that there is some- 
thing still wanting, something greater which remains unan- 
swered, and which, if answered, would respond more fully 
to aspirations, properly speaking, philosophical. 
I regard as scientifically legitimate this dissatisfaction of 
the mind even with the profoundest and minutest analysis of 
human progress. I am also of opinion that the problem of 
the Philosophy of Human History ought not to be wholly 
limited to the two questions formulated by Herder,-on the 
value of that history and the conditions in regard to its de- 
velopment,-since, although, in the consideration of the 
latter question, there may have been a glimpse of the ulti- 
mate and basic problem, the systems soon settle down into a 
mere analysis of conditions and a generalization about the 
facts of history which is secondary to the main problem. . . . 
T h a t  which cannot be described as an explanation of human 
facts by other facts of a like nature (they may be as general 
and fundamental as you like, but that does not affect their 
nature) cannot be described as history: and thus, what has 
by some schools of thinkers been called the “anatomy” and 
the “physiology” (or the “psychology,” from another stand- 
point) of human action, is not Philosophy of History.’ 
1 It is in not passing from that narrow standpoint that those claiming to 
have construed doctrines and systems of a Philosophy of History have been 
able to introduce and discuss the question of the anticipation of future his- 
tory. In the concrete conception of this question it has been affirmed: “Hu- 
manity, in the future, will act in such and such a way, and attain such and 
such standards of civilization and development.” The question ia neither 
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And now, in conclusion, there remains this culminating 
question: Does there exist any actual reality and basis cor- 
responding to that aspiration of ours towards a transcenden- 
tal explanation of what is a greater problem than all those 
scientifically formulated until now in the so-called Philos- 
ophy of History, o r  is it a pure whim and caprice of the 
spirit that is  never to be satisfied? To this question I do not 
believe we can provide a t  present a scientific answer; but I 
should point out that  neither our present nor permanent 
impotence regarding the solution of what is an idealistic 
problem can banish that problem from the mind, which con- 
tinues to  formulate it as an aspiration that is ineradicable 
and to which it is forever hopeful of finding a solution. 
And lastly we should remember, in order that the logical 
statement of the problem may leave no loophole of uncer- 
tainty, that the questions in which we embody the main sub- 
stance of the Philosophy of History do not, in their 
formulation, prejudge an affirmative answer, nor is such an 
answer an ineludible necessity for  their existence. Although 
our answer to all these questions were in the negative, they 
would continue to be problems present in our minds-so 
long, that is, as the answer is not indisputably a scientific 
one; and even if it were, it would, none the less, be legiti- 
mate material for  a Philosophy of History as real and 
settled as if  it answered in the affirmative those same inter- 
rogations which for the majority of men correspond to a 
desire, latent but ineradicable, to see explained in an or- 
dered, rational and scientific method, according to the gen- 
eral plan of the whole universe, the Life of Man. 
permissible nor can it be included in the field of the Philosophy of History. 
Thus, Meyer is right (in his “History of Antiquity”) when he judges that 
such predictions are impossible, since in that which is generally referred to, 
the individual element predominates, escaping all prognostication ; and 
affirms, always from that standpoint, that history only allows of comproba- 
tion, and not of any fixing of the future. 
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F o r  this reason the essential necessity of a Philosophy of 
History depends neither on a special solution of its problems 
nor on the actual possibility of a solution being afforded 
them. I t  arises principally from the presence of the prob- 
lem in our minds and from the corroborated fact that the 
highest expression of what, as concerns our history, is called 
progress, consists in the awakening of humanity to the ideal- 
istic quality behind its actions, of the things it is accustomed 
to  perform in ignorance of their value and significance ; and 
in the guidance of his life by man, ever increasingly, through 
the medium of that consciousness and with an ever clearer 
vision of the “why and wherefore” of things. To  assist, by 
due attention to  this problem, in promoting the study of it, 
and, some day (whenever that may be) ,  the solution of it, 
is more reasonable and human than to  bang the door upon it 
with an a priori negative against its possibility, o r  than to  
belittle and discard it. 
